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Culture of Influence

U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. James Fleming, from the Bagram Provincial Reconstruction Team, hands an Afghan child a toy inside a comprehensive health clinic in Charikar, Afghanistan, Jan. 12, 2008. The clinic is funded by the team. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Tyffani L. Davis)

Comprehensive Approach to Information Operations

Opportunities for International Public-Private Partnership

By Andrew Garfield

Current Situation

Information and influence are becoming more central to peace operations in general and counterinsurgency in particular. The U.S. Army recognizes the importance of strategic communications and information operations (including psychological operations, or PSYOP). Information is among the army’s six critical logical lines of operation (LLOs) or steps to solve a counterinsurgency challenge. Basic LLOs as outlined in the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) are information operations (IO), combat and civil security operations, training and employing host nation security forces, providing essential services, supporting better governance, and economic development.

The emphasis on IO is a striking departure from traditional military doctrine. To quote from the field manual, “Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence, synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be ‘wrapped in a bodyguard of information.’”

This is a revolutionary idea for the U.S. military. As recently as two years ago, most commanders saw IO and related tools of soft power as secondary functions designed to create the freedom of maneuver needed to facilitate combat operations.

By adopting the “bodyguard of information” concept, the U.S. Army can deny its enemies a critical advantage. If we adequately explain our every word and action, we will gain far greater support from the local population; minimize misunderstandings that arise when we do what we have to do; and significantly reduce an adversary’s opportunities to distort, denigrate, and deny our intentions, words, and deeds.

However, while significant progress has been made over the past two years, we are not out of the woods. U.S. information operations are still but a shadow of those of our opponents, despite the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Overall, Coalition media strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan have had only limited success, and it can be argued that our adversaries still have the information initiative.

Insurgent IO capabilities are advanced, and violence is their most effective propaganda tool. This is not a new strategy. Johann Most, a 19th-century German pamphleteer, described terrorism as “propaganda of the deed.” In both Iraq and Afghanistan, violence intimidates the uncommitted, undermines confidence in the authorities, demonstrates potency, and can provoke a disproportionate military response from both the authorities and the Coalition. And when insurgents, terrorists, and militiamen do attack, they use multimedia to amplify their actions and convey sophisticated messages to multiple audiences.

The IO strategy of the other side is broad. Enemy forces use low-technology strategies to convey their themes down to the grassroots and exploit mosques both to convey their point to the faithful and to suggest religious legitimacy. Extremists provide a constant reminder of their presence through graffiti. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, insurgents and militiamen use the arts, including paintings, poetry, and songwriting. They post flyers, distribute leaflets, and even publish newspapers and magazines.

Enemy forces are also proficient at using the information technology infrastructure that the U.S. and other Coalition countries have built. They use short message service (SMS) text messaging and Iraq’s telephone system to intimidate Iraqis and even Coalition members, and are well known for the video productions they distribute widely in communities that U.S. forces and the Iraqi government seek to influence.

The insurgents, terrorists, and militiamen are adept at the art of manipulation. They do not rely only on their own terrestrial and satellite stations but also use foreign journalists and media outlets to ensure that their messages and actions are conveyed to the widest possible audience. Perhaps their most important tool is the Internet—the Web reaches a mass audience and enables a quick response to Iraqi and Afghan government and U.S.-led Coalition arguments.

How to Overcome Coalition Shortcomings

In contrast to this sustained information onslaught toward all contested audiences, the Coalition influence strategy has significant shortcomings. Fortunately, most of the problems are relatively easy to fix. They include a lack of central coordination, abstract concepts that have no relevance for ordinary Afghans and Iraqis, investment in strategic advertising at the expense of far more effective grassroots efforts, a cumbersome approval process, a shortage of qualified personnel, failure to effectively manage private contractors, failure to develop local spokesmen, and failure to convince the U.S. public of the importance of funding effective information operations. In the face of these shortcomings, how does one plan, organize, execute, and properly measure the success of an IO campaign that will reach, be understood by, and positively influence key audiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere? This article and subsequent pieces in Serviam will outline an integrated approach designed to achieve this vital objective.

International Public-Private Partnership

The development and execution of a successful public diplomacy, strategic communication, or IO campaign requires an international public-private partnership. Such a partnership would combine American, international, and local experts in the development of human terrain analysis and target audience selection; attitudinal research, including polling, focus groups, and structured interviews; planning, creative development, testing, production, and placement of multimedia products; and comprehensive and impartial measurement of effectiveness and performance.

Success also requires an integrated methodology that combines the very best practices from academia and from the public (IO, PSYOP, public affairs, and public diplomacy communities) and private (advertising, marketing, public relations, crisis communications, and political campaigning) sectors.

To support U.S. government strategic communication efforts, this writer has developed a comprehensive approach to IO campaigning designed to ensure that we can understand, reach, and positively influence the attitudes and ultimately the behavior of target audiences in support of strategic objectives.

Three-Phase Approach

The key to our approach is to provide clients with a full-spectrum strategic communications and IO capability. This is achieved in three parallel phases: research, engagement, and measurement.

The research phase begins with the development of an intimate understanding of the audiences we need to influence, our adversary’s propaganda efforts, and the wider information environment in which we will operate. From this analysis, we can determine which specific audiences can and should be influenced and why. We can also determine with considerable accuracy what the audiences will and will not understand—the narratives they accept and use—and what means and media we should use to reach them.

Once this vital task is complete, we can begin the engagement phase, which includes the development, testing, production, and placement of multimedia products as part of an integrated IO or strategic communications campaign that exploits every possible tool of influence to reach the intended target audience and change attitudes and behavior.

The impact and success of the first two phases are assessed in the measurement phase, which involves an impartial assessment of performance and effectiveness. This constant and consistent parallel review process ensures that each campaign remains precisely focused on achieving the client’s objectives. The overall aim of our approach is to achieve understanding through research, engagement from understanding, and influence through engagement.

Prerequisites: Making the Case for Influence and Information Operations

U.S. military personnel treat an Iraqi boy in the aftermath of an insurgent mortar attack in the western Euphrates River valley town of Parwana. (AP Photo/U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Sgt. Jason D. Becksted)

An effective IO campaign requires that operational commanders fully understand the strengths and weakness of IO and are willing to use it as their primary line of operation or as an integrated part of every other operation. If commanders do not understand that everything they do and say will determine their relationship with the local population, then no matter how effective the IO professional is, he or she will never be heard above the noise generated by other uncoordinated and often counterproductive operations, particularly kinetic operations.

Every operation, even something as simple as driving between two forward operating bases, can have a profound impact on how we are perceived by the local population. Running one Afghan or Iraqi driver off the road or forcing one proud and innocent Pashtun tribesman to the ground, hooded and cuffed, in front of his fellow tribesmen and family, can undermine months of work designed to win hearts and minds and will often result in a kinetic response. In counterinsurgency operations, actions really do speak louder than words.

The successful commander must understand that he or she is engaged in an influence operation to secure and hold the support of a growing percentage of the local population. Without that support, collecting intelligence becomes increasingly difficult; and without intelligence, our operations become even more unfocused and unnecessarily provocative. With local support, anything is possible, as we have seen so vividly in Iraq’s al Anbar province over the past 10 months. Thus, the first and perhaps most important task of the IO professional is to influence his or her own command and commander.

The IO professional must find ways to educate the commander and staff regarding the impact of all actions undertaken by the unit or formation, and how every soldier or Marine is a front-line IO warrior. This means finding creative ways to remind commanders of some of the core principles of counterinsurgency as articulated in FM 3-24. These core principles include the following: all operations will positively or negatively influence local attitudes; sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be; sometimes the more force is used, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction; some of the best weapons in counterinsurgency do not shoot; and, most important, in counterinsurgency, relationships are everything.

• Next, the IO professional must explain what IO can and cannot do for the commander. Following are some examples of what IO can do:
• Manage the expectations of the local population by promising less and delivering more.
• Serve as a tool to restore or bolster the morale of the local population, which has likely been stressed by years of conflict and deprivation.
• Open a dialogue with the local population, perhaps over the heads of obstructive leaders.
• Build and reinforce relationships with individuals and communities.
• Inform the local population about our intentions and explain our actions.
• Apologize when we do something that is perceived as wrong by the local population.
• Publicize our effective responses to complaints.
• Highlight the vices of opponents and counter adversary propaganda on a 24/7 basis.
• Warn, threaten, or deter in order to reduce the number of occasions when we must act aggressively and use force.
• Publicize the successes of the national government, local communities, and individuals in the face of our common enemies, and selectively publicize our own successes.

Thus, the most important role of the IO professional is to educate commanders, staffs, and units so they understand that they are the front line of the IO battle, and their actions and words will have the greatest informational impact. Front-line units can lead the IO battle in three ways: through communication, engagement, and direct support.

First, in the course of their normal duties, units can take every opportunity to communicate with the local population; for example, while on patrol, at checkpoints, and during meetings. All soldiers can be given talking points to use with the local population.

Second, leaders and units can plan operations with the specific intent of engaging in a dialogue with a local leader or community. An example is to hold events and social gatherings designed simply to foster better relationships or to hold “town hall” meetings to explain actions or even to apologize.

Third, and perhaps most important, units can provide direct support to a local community; for example, providing security and protection; showing respect and courtesy; providing humanitarian assistance; helping to rebuild communities, infrastructure, and the economy; and assisting and supporting the local government and security forces.

If the unit or formation understands its vital role in the influence battle, the IO campaign can be focused on exploiting and publicizing the success that will inevitably follow, and on attacking enemies and countering their propaganda. If units do not fully understand their role on the IO front line, then the IO campaign itself will likely be defensive and reactive. Failure to understand that every operation influences opinions is likely to hand the informational initiative to the enemy.

Convincing the warrior of this reality is a significant challenge, but if we cannot convince our own commanders, how are we going to convince the Iraqi or Afghan populations to support their governments and the Coalition, and resist a deadly and merciless insurgency?

Task Order Analysis

As with the planning of any successful operation, planning for information operations must start with a detailed review of each task order to ensure that requirements and operational constraints are fully understood. Such analysis will also ensure that the full extent of all of the challenges to be faced are identified and understood. This should be a formalized process with no ambiguity or misunderstanding, so that all parties fully understand exactly what is desired and what is achievable. The IO professional should seek clarity regarding the following issues: overarching objectives (e.g., inform, warn, coerce, deter, motivate); desired message themes; intended/desired audience(s); effects to be achieved; success criteria; time frame; resources; task constraints; and coordination requirements (with other IO/public affairs activities).

This initial coordination and assessment process ensures that the IO professional is (1) fully apprised of and focused on the goals, objectives, and desired effects; (2) agile, with the awareness needed to quickly modify an ongoing campaign to meet changing operational requirements; and (3) able to provide timely recommendations for future campaigns, products, and measurable objectives.

Conduct Rigorous Self-Appraisal

Sun Tzu understood that, to succeed in any conflict, it is vital to know both one’s enemy and oneself: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Rigorous self-appraisal ensures that one’s strengths are exploited to greatest effect and one’s weaknesses are either eliminated or protected. This effort requires an exceptional degree of honesty and introspection to ensure that no issue can emerge during a campaign that will deflect the IO professional from the core message or undermine the confidence of an audience in the message or messenger.

Few problems are so severe that they cannot be overcome if they are identified in advance and measures are taken immediately to mitigate or ameliorate negative consequences. Indeed, some issues can be turned to advantage if they are dealt with in advance. Also, few internal issues are likely to emerge that cannot be predicted well in advance through a careful self-appraisal. In any conflict, we can be certain of one thing; our opponent will be conducting a thorough review of us to find any chinks in our armor, which they will then ruthlessly exploit. Therefore, we seek to mirror-image the enemy’s review process to understand what they perceive to be our strengths and weaknesses.

This self-appraisal process does not take very long (typically, a few hours) but is vital to establish a baseline understanding of our strengths and weaknesses, as we perceive them and as our adversaries and contested audiences perceive them (see the sidebar for examples of questions we should ask ourselves and our clients). This self-appraisal process ensures that we begin the development of each new IO campaign with an objective understanding of our strengths and weaknesses as we, our target audiences, and our adversaries see them. Sun Tzu understood that this knowledge is vital to succeed in any conflict. His philosophy is studied in U.S. military academies and universities, but his wisdom is seldom strategically applied.

Summary

Having addressed the prerequisites, the IO professional is ready to begin the target audience research and selection phase. This phase will be explained in the next edition of Serviam, followed by an article on engaging the target audience and measuring the results of the campaign. Andrew Garfield is a British information and influence operations theoretician and practitioner with experience in Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He is vice president for operations at Glevum Associates, an international communication consulting firm, and presently trains U.S. commanders in IO prior to their deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Andrew Garfield is a British information and influence operations theoretician and practitioner with experience in Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He is vice president for operations at Glevum Associates, an international communication consulting firm, and presently trains U.S. commanders in IO prior to their deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.

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From the March/April 2008 issue of Serviam.